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FROM NONDIFFERENTIATION TO
FACTUAL EQUALITY: GENDER EQUALITY
JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE GERMAN
BASIC LAW
Monica Bhattacharyya*
Gender equality issues have been a major focus of German
political and public discussion in recent years. One subject of
debate has concerned the adequacy of legal protections against
sex-based discrimination and sexual harassment. In June
1994, after years of inactivity on the federal level, the German
Parliament responded to this debate by passing legislation
aimed towards promoting employment opportunities for women
in the federal administration' and providing protection against
sexual harassment in both private and public employment.2
The use of preferential treatment programs favoring women in
civil service positions has also been an ever-recurring subject
of controversy.
The attention to gender issues has taken on constitutional
significance as well. As originally adopted in 1949, article 3 of
the German Basic Law3 provided:
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1. Gesetz zur Durchsetzung der Gleichberechtigung von Frauen und
Mannern, art. 1 § 2, 1994 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 1406 (F.R.G.).
2. Id., art. 10 § 1, 1994 BGB1 I 1412 (F.R.G.).
3. The German Basic Law was promulgated in 1949 as a provisional consti-
tution for the West German states. Drafting was accomplished primarily by the
Parliamentary Council, a committee composed of 70 representatives from the 11
West German Leinder and from Berlin. See infra note 9. The Basic Law estab-
lished West Germany as a "democratic and social federal state," Grundgesetz [Ba-
sic Law] [GG] art. 20 (F.R.G.), committed to an enforceable set of fundamental
rights. See generally DONALD P. KOMIERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1989); 3 KLAUS STERN, DAS STAATSRECHT
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (1988). Through the Treaty Between the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the Establish-
ment of German Unity, the Basic Law's provisions now apply to all of Germany.
Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik Uiber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands:
Einigungsvertragsgesetz, Aug. 31, 1990, F.R.G.-G.D.R., 1990 BGBI. 11 889 [here-
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(1) All persons are equal before the law.
(2) Men and women shall have equal rights.
(3) No one may be disadvantaged or favored because of his
sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and
origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.4
Paragraphs 2 and 3, both of which specifically address gender,
were traditionally understood to guarantee formal equality, or
the elimination of legal norms which differentiate on the basis
of sex. However, a growing number of commentators in recent
years have advocated an approach that would go beyond for-
mal equality to encompass "factual equality."5 According to a
factual equality approach, the Basic Law's provisions not only
require the elimination of sex-based discriminatory laws, but
also the activist reform of discriminatory social practices.
Three recent legal events have shifted Germany's constitu-
tional framework in precisely this direction. The first of these
events was the Prohibition on Night Work Dedision, delivered
in January 1992, which presented the Constitutional Court's
first explicit approval of a factual equality approach.' The sec-
ond was a 1993 Constitutional Court decision that, in address-
ing the interpretation of the German Civil Code's
antidiscrimination provision, affirmed and built upon this
inafter Einigungsvertragsgesetz] (Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic on the Establishment of German Unity).
4. The text of article 3 as it appears in German:
(1) Alle Menschen sind vor dem Gesetz gleich.
(2) Mfinner und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt.
(3) Niemand darf wegen seines Geschlechtes, seiner Abstammung, seiner
Rasse, seiner Sprache, seiner Heimat und Herkunift, seines Glaubens,
seiner religi6sen oder politischen Anschauungen benachteiligt oder
bevorzugt werden.
GG art. 3.
5. See, e.g., ANNE BREUER, ANTIDISKRIMINIERUNGSGESETZGEBUNG - CHANCE
ODER IRRWEG? (1991); ULRICH MAIDOWSKI, UMGEKEHRTE DISKRIMINIERUNG (1989);
UTE SACKSOFSKY, DAS GRUNDRECHT AUF GLEICHBERECHTIGUNG: EINE
RECHTSDOGMATISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG ZU ARTIKEL 3 ABSATZ 2 DES GRUNDGESTZES
(1991); HEiNZ-GERD SUELMANN, DIE HORIZONTALWIRKUNG DES ART. II GG (1994);
Sibylle Raasch, Frauenquoten und Minnerrechte, 25 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 427 (1991);
Spiros Simitis, Art. 3 des Grundgesetzes: Vom Diskriminierungsverbot zum
Gleichstellungsgebot, 5 DIE NEuE GESELLSCHAFT, FRANKFURTER HEFTE 395 (1989).
6. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, Bundesverfassungsgericht [federal constitution-
al court] [BVerfG], 85 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE]
191 (F!R.G.).
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approach.' The third and most dramatic event was the amend-
ment to the Basic Law, adopted in October 1994, which added
the following language to article 3, paragraph 2: "The state
supports the actual achievement of equal rights for women and
men and works towards the elimination of existing disadvan-
tages."8
This article, after summarizing the traditional doctrinal
framework applicable to article 3's gender equality provisions,
analyzes the factual equality approach as developed thus far.
As will be shown, factual equality provides a significantly
different focus for Germany's gender equality jurisprudence.
However, many questions regarding its precise content remain
to be determined.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE TRADITIONAL DOCTRINAL
FRAMEWORK
A. Origins9
References to gender equality as a constitutional principle
in German law first appeared in the 1919 Weimar Constitu-
tion. Article 109, paragraph 2 provided that "[mien and women
have principally the same political rights and duties."'0 Along
the same lines, article 119, establishing marriage as a consti-
tutionally-protected institution, stated that "[marriage] is
based upon the equal rights of both sexes."" Nevertheless,
these provisions were understood by both courts and commen-
tators as being unenforceable, and thus having merely pro-
grammatic significance. 2
During the drafting of the Basic Law, the wording of the
gender equality guarantees became the subject of heated de-
7. Judgment of Nov. 16, 1993, BVerfG, 89 BVerfGE 276 (F.R.G.).
8. 'Der Staat fdrdert die tatsachliche Durchsetzung der Gleichberechtigung
von Frauen und Mannern und wirkt auf die Beseitigung bestehender Nachteile
bin." Gesetz zur Anderung des Grundgesetzes, 1994 BGBl. I 3146 (F.R.G).
9. For a detailed account of the events leading to the adoption of Article 3's
gender provisions, see BARBARA BOTrTGER, DAS REcHT AUF GLEICHmrIT UND
DIFFERENZ 160-237 (1990). See also SACKSOFSKY, supra note 5, at 323-31.
10. WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG [Weimar Constitution] [WRV] art. 109 (for-
mer constitution of Germany).
11. WRV art. 119.
12. See JOCHEN HOFMANN, DAS GLEIcHBEREcHTIGUNGSGEBOT DES ARTIKEL 3
ABSATZ 2 GG IN RECHTSPRECHUNG UND LEHRE 14 (1986); BREUER, supra note 5,
at 125 n.86.
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bate, much of which concerned the effect of these guarantees
on marriage and family law." According to civil code provi-
sions at the time, husbands possessed final decisionmaking
authority over almost all aspects of the family and household.
For instance, the husband's permission was required in order
for any married woman to open a bank account or to hold a job
outside the home.' Thus, a major goal of reform-minded par-
ticipants in the Parliamentary Council, in particular represen-
tatives of the Social Democratic Party, was to ensure that sex-
specific legal norms of this type would be rewritten.
The first draft proposal specifically addressing gender
equality was approved by a Parliamentary Council subcommit-
tee in October 1948. According to this draft, paragraph 2 would
state that "[men and women have the same political rights
and duties." 5 This formulation Was almost identical to the
Weimar Constitution's gender equality clause." Also included
in this draft was a version of paragraph 3 which did not in-
clude gender-specific language: "No one may be disadvantaged
or favored because of his parentage, his race, his language, his
homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political
opinions."7
At the next subcommittee session, Social Democratic Party
representatives proposed what was to become paragraph 2's
final formulation: 'Men and women shall have equal rights.""
These representatives argued that the previously adopted
proposal, while guaranteeing equal "political rights and duties"
did not extend to private law norms such as family and mar-
riage law. 9 The subcommittee did not adopt the proposed lan-
13. Drafting of the Basic Law took place in two stages. An initial set of pro-
posals was developed in August 1948 at the Herrenchiemsee Conference. The par-
ticipants were 12 delegates - one from each of the 11 Ldnder in the Western
Allied zones and one from Berlin - and 15 accompanying advisors. See STERN,
supra note 3, at 140-68. No women were included among the participants.
BOTTGER, supra note 9, at 175.
Drafting was then taken up by the Parliamentary Council, a committee
composed of 70 representatives from the 11 Lnder and from Berlin. Four of the
representatives were women. Id. at 169.
14. See BOTTGER, supra note 9, at 233.
15. Id. at 179 (quoting Parliamentary Council Record).
16. Id. at 173.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 180.
19. Id.
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guage. However, under a compromise solution reached at that
session, paragraph 3 was amended to include a reference to
sex. Thus, at least in theory, paragraph 2 would guarantee
women the same political rights, such as the right to vote or to
serve as an elected representative, while paragraph 3, guaran-
teeing that no person would be disadvantaged or favored on
the basis of sex, would guarantee equal rights within private
law.20
Led by Representative Elisabeth Selbert, the Social Demo-
crats renewed their proposal for the "equal rights" formulation
of paragraph 2 before the Parliamentary Council's main com-
mittee. As explained by Selbert, paragraph 3's guarantee
against being "disadvantaged or favored" on the basis of sex
did not go far enough because it could easily be interpreted to
permit continuation of the status quo:
It is obvious that one must go further today than was done in
Weimar and that women must be given equal rights in all
areas [of law] .... I believe that the current version [of the
equality article], 'No one may be disadvantaged or favored
because of his sex.... .' does not encompass the meaning of
equal rights. I can imagine doctoral students who would
prove to us that women are not disadvantaged nor men fa-
vored under [the current] civil law.2
That Selbert's fears were justified is colorfully confirmed by
the statement of a delegate voicing opposition to the introduc-
tion of Selbert's "equal rights" language:
This [formulation] initially appears harmless and represents,
from a general human and social viewpoint, a self-evident
proposition. On the other hand, were it to be anchored on a
legal basis within the state's basic law, this clause would
have unforeseeable legal and political consequences. Almost
all the marriage and family law regulation of the BGB, which
have been in f6rce for almost 50 years, would be overthrown
and invalidated.22
20. See id. at 181.
21. BREUER, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting Proceedings of the Main Committee).
22. BOTIGER, supra note 9, at 183 (quoting the Remarks of Albert Finck,
Christian Democratic Party, Parlimentarischer Rat 12:48/345).
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The Social Democrats' proposal was rejected at the 17th
Sitting of the Parliamentary Council's head committee by a 11-
9 vote.' However, on January 18, 1949, after massive public
mobilization by individuals, women's groups, and labor associa-
tions, the committee unanimously adopted the Social
Democrats' proposed paragraph 2, in addition to retaining a
reference to sex within the language of paragraph 3.24 In or-
der to mitigate the shock to the existing legal structure, the
Council adopted a transition rule granting the legislature until
March 31, 1953 to replace laws in violation of article 3, para-
graph 2Y
The Parliamentary Council officially announced the final
version of the Basic Law, including the revised paragraphs 2
and 3 of article 3 on May 23, 1949.26
The proceedings leading to the adoption of article 3's gen-
der provisions show that the focus of reformers was the elimi-
nation of sex-specific limitations on women in the areas of
marriage and family law. Moreover, in order to counter argu-
ments legitimizing the status quo through reference to "natu-
ral differences," the Social Democrats insisted on the equal
rights language of paragraph 2 rather than remaining satisfied
with paragraph 3's prohibition against being "disadvantaged"
or "favored" on the basis of sex. This focus on nondifferentia-
tion would be adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court in
its interpretation of article 3's gender provisions.
B. The Traditional Framework
During the first four decades of the Basic Law's existence,
the Federal Constitutional Court's 7 gender equality jurispru-
23. See BOTTGER, supra note 9, at 188.
24. See id. at 224-25.
25. GG art. 117, para. 1 provided that: "Existing law conflicting with Article 3
paragraph 2 will remain in force until it has been modified, but not beyond March
31, 1953."
26. BOTTGER, supra note 9, at 236.
27. The German Federal Constitutional Court, whose jurisdiction includes
cases requiring "concrete judicial review" (konkrete Normenkontrolle) and "constitu-
tional complaints," (Verfassungsbeschwerde) has played the primary role in deter-
mining the judicial significance of Article 3's provisions. Concrete judicial review
occurs when a court, in the course of a lawsuit, concludes that a federal or state
legal norm violates the Constitution. In such instances, the court must refer the
constitutional question to the Federal Constitutional Court for a decision before a
final resolution of the case. GG art. 100, para. 1; Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz
920 [Vol. XXI:3
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dence focused upon the elimination of legal norms which un-
justifiably differentiated on the basis of gender. This approach
was expressed doctrinally as a presumption against gender-
based differentiation, with allowances for such differentiation
where justified by "biological or functional" differences. As
concluded by the Court in its first case interpreting article 3's
gender equality guarantees, "[tihe political question, whether
the differences named in Article 3 paragraphs 2 and 3 provide
a considerable basis for differentiation in law-a question with
respect to which different experienced opinions are possible-is
[with these paragraphs] constitutionally disavowed."
Article 3's presumption against sex-based differentiation
was applied by the Court over the next several decades to
declare unconstitutional a large number of family and inheri-
tance-related laws. These laws included, for example, a law
providing the husband with final decisionmaking authority
over decisions affecting the child where the two parents could
not agree,29 an inheritance law giving preference to males,"0
laws establishing the husband's birth name as the family
name,3 1 conflicts of law norms for inheritance and divorce giv-
ing priority to the law of the husband's land of citizenship,32
and citizenship laws according to 'which child would be pre-
sumed to take on the citizenship of the father.33
Despite its commitment to the principle of nondifferentia-
tion, the Federal Constitutional Court delineated two catego-
ries of exceptions under which gender-specific legal norms
would be permissible. The first category of exceptions, repre-
senting a nod to the "separate spheres" ideology against which
Elisabeth Selbert had fought during the Basic Law's drafting,
were those motivated by "functional" differences "relating to
the division of labor within the household."34 This category of
§§ 80-82, 1993 BGB1. I 1473 (F.R.G.). Constitutional complaints may be filed with
the Federal Constitutional Court by any person who claims that his constitutional
rights have been violated by an action of the state (after exhaustion of other legal
remedies). GG art. 93, para. 4(a); Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz §§ 90-95, 1993
BGB1. I 1473 (FR.G.).
28. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1953, BVerfG, 3 BVerfGE 225, 240 (FR.G.).
29. Judgment of July 29, 1959, BVerfG, 10 BVerfGE 59 (F.R.G.).
30. Judgment of Mar. 20, 1963, BVerfG, 15 BVerfGE 337 (F.R.G.).
31. Judgment of May 31, 1978, BVerfG, 48 BVerfGE 327 (F.R.G.).
32. Judgment of Feb. 22, 1983, BVerfG, 63 BVerfGE 181 (F.R.G.); Judgment
of Jan. 8, 1985, BVerfG, 68 BVerfGE 384 (F.R.G.).
33. Judgment of Apr. 23, 1974, BVerft, 37 BVerfGE 217 (F.R.G.).
34. Judgment of Dec. 18, 1953, BVerfG, 3 BVerfGE 225, 242 (F.R.G.). While
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exceptions played an important role during the 1950s and
1960s in cases addressing pension benefits and child support
payments. In a 1963 decision, for example, the Court upheld
the constitutionality of a law which made it more difficult for
widowers to receive compensatory support benefits than for
widows.35 As explained by the Court, the Jaw contemplated
making up for the income lost due to the death of the spouse.
Consequently, the differential treatment was justified by its
"correspondence to the typical division of work between the
sexes within the family."36
Similarly, in a decision involving child support, the Court,
relying upon the parents' "separate functions with respect to
the child," held that the civil code provision requiring the fa-
ther to bear primary responsibility for child support payments
to children born out-of-wedlock did not violate article 3's gen-
der provisions.37 Rather, this division of responsibility derived
from the traditional family roles in which "the wife fulfills her
duty to contribute to the household by housework, while the
man earns the necessary income through employment. Both
types of household support are of equal worth and are comple-
mentary to each other."38
In the 1970's, the functional differences fell into disrepute
and disuse as the Court concluded that the separate spheres
model was outdated. As stated by the Court in a 1978 decision:
Above all, the increasing participation of women in the em-
ployment process has contributed to the decline of the earlier
prevailing view that it contradicts the natural division of
labor in marriage and family for the wife to be employed and
not to restrict herself to fulfilling her duties in the marriage
and family. Correspondingly... the model of the wife, which
earlier was . . . the housewife, has fundamentally
changed .... Under present circumstances, the division of
duties within the marriage is in the first instance a matter
this category of exceptions has been severely criticized, at least one commentator
has argued that the Constitutional Court applied the category only in situations
where the application would not, in its view, materially disadvantage women. See
SACKSOFSKY, supra note 5, at 52-63.
35. Judgment of July 24, 1963, BVerfG, 17 BVerfGE 1 (F.R.G.).
36. Id. at 5.
37. Judgment of July 21, 1960, BVerfG, 11 BVerfGE 277 (F.R.G.).
38. Id. at 280.
922 [Vol. MX:3
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for the free decision of the marriage partners, and finds its
boundaries only in the care of the children."
A 1979 decision confirmed the rejection of the housewife model
as an outdated stereotype and comprised the Court's first "re-
verse discrimination" decision. Before the Court was a law
which provided working women, but not men, the right to one
extra day of paid leave per year in order to take care of
household responsibilities.0 Reasoning that the law was
based on nothing more than the "conventional conception" that
it was the duty of the woman to take care of household respon-
sibilities,4 the Constitutional Court found it unconstitutional.
The second category of exceptions under which gender-
specific legal norms would be allowed were those following
from "biological differences." This category, while seldom in-
voked in cases by the Constitutional Court, has been under-
stood primarily as justifying special protections for women
during pregnancy."
After the demise of the functional differences exception in
the 1970's, article 3's guarantees became almost exclusively
identified with the principle of nondifferentiation. Also at this
time, increasing numbers of commentators began noting the
limitations of that principle.
C. The Limits of Nondifferentiation
While nondifferentiation had been useful in addressing
many of the barriers to sex equality, it did little to address the
problems remaining after sex-specific legal norms had been
eliminated. It did not, for example, address the need for stron-
ger antidiscrimination laws, the reorganization of work and
family structures, or the possible need for preferential treat-
ment programs in public organizations. As a result, many
commentators began to argue that the doctrinal framework
used with respect to article 3 should be reconceptualized to
39. Judgment of May 31, 1978, BVerfG, 48 BVerfGE 327, 338 (F.R.G.).
40. Judgment of Nov. 13, 1979, BVerfG, 52 BVerfGE 369 (F.R.G.).
41. Id. at 376.
42. See THEODOR MAUNZ & GUNTER DoRIG, GRUNDGESETZ: KoMAENTAR (Diirig,
Art. 3, Abs. 11 Rdn. 13-15 (1973)).
1996] 923
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
take into account not just formal inequality, but also social
inequality.
43
The main focal point for the emerging debate has been the
admissibility of preferential treatment programs-specifically,
preferential treatment regulations adopted by Ldnder govern-
ments with respect to civil service employment. The exact form
of these regulations varies. In most cases, however, the regula-
tions consist of a tie-breaker rule according to which the fem-
ale candidate for a position is preferred in situations where a
male and a female candidate are equally qualified for a posi-
tion. Though most of these regulations have been adopted as
non-binding guidelines, some have the force of law."
The preferential treatment regulations constitute a logical
focal point for discussion because of the direct conflict they
pose between a nondifferentiation approach to equality and a
"factual equality" approach which focuses on achieving a just
distribution of society's opportunities for women and men.
According to the former model, preferential treatment regula-
tions violate the principle of equality because they afford dif-
fering treatment to men and women. According to the latter
model, preferential treatment regulations may be a necessary
step for achievement of equality in situations characterized by
great social inequality.
A 1987 decision by the Court represents a turning point
between the traditional doctrinal structure and the "factual
equality" standard which would be announced by the Court in
the 1992 Prohibition on Night Work Decision.45 Before the
Court was a law allowing women to begin receiving govern-
ment secured retirement benefits from age 60 and men from
the age of 65.46 The legislative justification provided was that
women have "in many cases had a double career as employee
and housewife, a situation which may bring about an early
43. See supra note 5.
44. Linder governments adopting such programs include Baden-WUrttemberg,
Thlringen, Schleswig-Holstein, Sachsen, Saarland, Rheinland-Pfalz, Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Niedersachsen, Hessen, Hamburg, and Bremen. See BERTEIMANN,
COLNERIC, PFARR, AND Rusr, IIANDBUCH ZUR FRAUENERWERBSTATIGKEIT § 5.2
(1993) (compilation of preferential treatment regulations on Linder level).
In addition, the Green Party and Social Democratic Party, as well as some
private companies, have introduced more far-reaching preferential treatment guide.
lines. Id.
45. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1987, BVerfG, 74 BVerfGE 163 (F.R.G.).
46. Id.
924 [Vol. MX:3
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decline in strength and thus early incapability to carry on a
career."
47
The Federal Constitutional Court held that the law was
constitutional. However, rather than invoking either the bio-
logical or functional differences exceptions, the Court created a
new category of exceptions. Under the new category, unequal
treatment would be allowable in order to compensate for "so-
cial disadvantages... which could be traced to biological dif-
ference[s] .,,48 The Court stated that such disadvantages in-
cluded lower career positions, salaries, and pension expecta-
tions due to anticipation by others of a break in a woman's
career life for childbearing.49 Because the pension law could
be justified on the basis of these considerations, it did not
violate article 3. While the Court's reasoning in this decision
followed the traditional doctrinal framework by recognizing
nondifferentiation as the rule from which exceptions would be
carved, its recognition of social disadvantage as a relevant
factor indicated a growing concern for the achievement of fac-
tual, as opposed to formal, equality."
IL FACTUAL EQUALITY
A. The Prohibition on Night Work Decision
The Prohibition on Night Work Decision,51 delivered in
January 1992, was the first case to make an explicit break
with the Court's traditional approach. At issue was a long-
controversial regulation prohibiting women from working after
8:00 p.m. or before 6:00 a.m. on all days, and from working
after 5:00 p.m. on days preceding Sundays and holidays. 2 The
47. Id. at 165.
48. Id. at 180.
49. Id. at 180-81.
50. The following passage from this decision foreshadowed more dramatic
developments:
In recent times it has been mentioned, that the gender equality provi-
sion, like other fundamental rights, may give rise to ... a positive duty
for the legislature to support and forward its realization .... [However],
whether and to what extent the legislature could be bound... to create
the conditions for factual equality between men and women need not be
decided here.
Id. at 179-80.
51. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, BVerfG, 85 BVerfGE 191 (F.R.G.).
52. Arbeitszeitordnung § 19(1) (enacted April 30, 1938). The regulation did not
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regulation derived from an 1891 law which, citing interests in
"health" and "family life," had set restrictions upon allowable
working hours for women.
The Court received submissions on the question of the
regulation's constitutionality from various groups representing
labor, management, and women's interests.53 The primary
argument offered in support of the regulation was the greater
physical risk to women, in comparison to men, of night work.
The risk was caused, the argument went, not by any inherent
weakness of women in comparison to men, but by the likeli-
hood that women, and not men, would also have household and
childcare responsibilities. Other supporting arguments includ-
ed the greater risk to women of sexual harassment and of acci-
dents while travelling to and from the workplace. The argu-
ments presented in opposition to the regulation included the
negative effect of the regulation on women's competitiveness in
the job market and a rejection of the proposition that the phys-
ical risk of night work was greater for women than for men.54
The Constitutional Court began its analysis by presenting
the applicable legal standards for paragraphs 2 and 3 of article
3. The Court explained that paragraph 3, guaranteeing that
"no one may be prejudiced or favored because of his sex," rep-
resented the principle of equal legal treatment." "As a matter
of principle, gender-as with the other characteristics named
apply to professional jobs; in addition, exceptions applied to work in certain fields,
including health care and theater-related work.
The case was brought before the Court by an employer who, pursuant to
the regulation, had been fined 500 DM for using women workers to pack baked
goods during night hours.
53. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, 85 BVerfGE at 200-03.
54. The regulation was supported by the Bundesminister fdr Arbeit und
Sozialordnung (Federal Minister for Work and Social Organization) and the Deut-
sche Gewerkschaftsbund (the German Trade Union Federation). Among those op-
posed were employer organizations and the Deutsche Juristennenbund (German
Federation of Women Jurists).
The permissibility of night work regulations for women was also examined
by the European Court of Justice in 1991 and by the Austrian Constitutional
Court in March 1992. The European Court of Justice held that a French night
work regulation violated the EC directive prohibiting gender-based discrimination
in employment. The Austrian Constitutional Court held that the night work regu-
lation was justified by the need to protect women with small children from the
harmful physical effects of night work. See Sibylle Raasch, Gleichstellung der
Geschlechter oder Nachtarbeitsverbot far Frauen?, 25 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 427 (1992),
for a comparative discussion of the German, EC, and Austrian court decisions.
55. Judgment of Jan. 28, 1992, 85 BVerfGE at 206.
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in [plaragraph 3-may not be used as a touchstone for differ-
ent legal treatment."56 Accordingly, legal norms which treat
persons differently on the basis of gender are admissible only
"to the extent that they are necessary for the solution of prob-
lems which affect only men or only women."57 So defined,
paragraph 3 resembled the Court's traditional approach to
article 3's guarantees.
In contrast, paragraph 2's guarantee of "equal rights" for
men and women had a quite separate content:
Article 3, paragraph 2, so far as it concerns the question of
whether a regulation disadvantages women on account of
their gender to an unjust end, contains no further or more
specific demands [than article 3, paragraph 3]. Article 3,
paragraph 2 goes beyond the discrimination prohibition of
article 3, paragraph 3 by establishing a command for equal
rights which encompasses social reality. The proposition "men
and women have equal rights" aims not only to set aside
legal norms that advantage or disadvantage based on gender,
but to achieve equal rights between the sexes for the future.
It aims towards the adjustment of social roles and relation-
ships. 8
As set forth in this passage, paragraph 2 concerns itself with
the achievement of factual equality, namely the "assimilation
of social roles and relationships" and "a command for equal
rights which encompasses social reality." Consequently, the
focus of paragraph 2 is distinct from paragraph 3's concern
with nondifferentiation.
In accordance with these standards, the Court reasoned
that the night work regulation violated article 3's guarantees.
First, the regulation violated paragraph 3's prohibition of any
differential treatment not justified as "necessary for the solu-
tion of problems which affect only men or only women." With
respect to the argument that women are physically affected
more than men by night work, the Court held that night work
is equally harmful for men. "The assumption that women...
suffer more as a result of night work than men has no reliable
56. Id. at 206.
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id. at 206-07.
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support in the findings of medical research."59 To the argu-
ment that women are affected more because of their household
and childcare responsibilities, the Court concluded that "the
additional burden of housework and childcare is not a gender-
specific characteristic."0 Finally, the Court rejected a ratio-
nale based on the greater danger women face when returning
home from work at night. "The state may not shirk its duty to
protect women against violent attacks on public streets by
reducing her freedom to work .... 6'
The Court then went on to find that the regulation was
not justified by paragraph 2's goal of factual equality.6 2 Al-
though the regulation would protect many women from the
health effects of night work, the Court stated it would also
disadvantage women by barring them from certain jobs. Be-
cause the regulation would "render the dismantling of social
disadvantages for women more difficult," the prohibition of
night work was not 'legitimized through the command for
equal rights contained in Article 3, paragraph 2."' Therefore,
the Court held that as written, the night work regulation was
unconstitutional.
The significance of this holding lies not in the re-
sult-which could have easily been reached under its tradition-
al approach-but in the reasoning.' By interpreting para-
graph 2 in terms of "the adjustment of social roles and rela-
tionships" and the "dismantling of social disadvantages," the
Court provided its first explicit accommodation of factual
equality within the doctrinal framework applicable to article 3.
Whereas nondifferentiation had aimed towards ensuring that
each person enjoyed the same legal rights, the new standard
for paragraph 2 recognized the need for more far-reaching
transformations of social structures.65 The Court also broke
59. Id. at 208.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 209.
62. Id. at 209-10.
63. Id. at 209.
64. One can speculate that the Prohibition on Night Work decision was an
attractive vehicle because of this fact. By first appearing in a case where it would
not make a difference in the outcome, the new standard was incorporated into the
existing framework in the least dramatic way possible.
65. See Jtirgen Kilbling, Arbeitsrecht in der Rechtsprechung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 4 ARBEIT UND RECHT 126, 129 (1994) (Article 3, para-
graph 2 is now directed towards "the alteration of social reality"); Raasch, supra
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with the past by creating a distinction between its interpreta-
tion of paragraph 2 and its interpretation of paragraph
3-paragraphs which, prior to this decision, had been viewed
as having identical content. This distinction served the impor-
tant purpose of allowing the Court to incorporate factual equal-
ity into its analytic framework without making obsolete the
traditional equal treatment approach. By interpreting para-
graph 3 in terms of equal legal treatment and paragraph 2 in
terms of factual equality, the Court recognized the validity of
each approach.
Since much of the debate surrounding article 3's guaran-
tees has focused on the constitutional status of preferential
treatment programs, the difficult question, of course, is how to
resolve the potential conflict between equal treatment and
factual equality. The Court did not address this question in the
Prohibition on Nightwork Decision. However, by finding the
night work regulation violated paragraph 3, and proceeding to
find that the regulation was not 'legitimized" by paragraph 2,
the Court suggested that considerations of factual equality
would, or at least could, trump equal treatment in cases of
conflict. Left unresolved were questions of whether factual
equality would always, or only sometimes outweigh equal
treatment, and if the latter, what the relevant considerations
would be.
B. Decision Interpreting Section 611a BGB
The Constitutional Court reaffirmed and expanded upon
its newly-announced factual equality approach in a 1993 deci-
sion addressing section 611a of the German Civil Code (BGB)
which is the Code's employment discrimination provision.
6
The case was brought as a constitutional complaint by a wom-
an who had responded to a job announcement placed by the
employer, a university professor, for a position as an assistant
with a fiber technology research project. ' The job description
called for a degree in machine tool mechanics or a related
note 54 (characterizing this decision as an important step towards recognition of
preferential treatment programs as constitutionally permissible).
66. Judgment of Nov. 16, 1993, BVerfG, 89 BVerfGE 276 (F.R.G.).
67. Id. at 279.
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field.6" The complainant was one of approximately 40 interest-
ed applicants and the only female applicant.69 She, along with
the other applicants who fulfilled the job description require-
ments, was informed that she would be invited to an inter-
view." After that communication, however, the plaintiff was
never invited to an interview and two of the other applicants
were hired.7 Upon inquiry, one of the professor's assistants
informed the complainant that she had not been chosen be-
cause the job activities were unsuitable for a woman. 2 The
complainant later received a letter to the same effect from the
professor, in which the professor stated that he had been con-
vinced, after the posting of the job notice, that the job activities
would be too physically strenuous for a woman."a
The complainant brought an action in labor court for sex
discrimination in violation of section 611a BGB, the German
Civil Code provision prohibiting sex-discrimination in the initi-
ation of an employment relation. 4 In defense, the employer
contended that the real reason for the rejection was not the
complainant's gender, but her lack of sufficient job experience.
The earlier communications were an attempt to explain the
rejection in as considerate a manner as possible. The labor
court found in favor of the employer, concluding that although
the plaintiff had proven that she had been treated differently
from the other applicants on the basis of gender, the decision
not to hire her was justified by the indisputably superior quali-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. § 611a of the Bilrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] provides in pertinent part:
The employer may not disadvantage an employee on the basis of sex by
an agreement or measure, particularly with respect to the initiation of
the employment relation, promotion, or termination. Differential treatment
on the basis of sex is permissible, however, to the extent that . . . a
particular sex is a necessary requirement for the activity.
Section 611a was enacted pursuant to European Community Directive
76/207 of February 9, 1976, which required member states to pass laws providing
protection against sex-based employment discrimination. See generally Josephine
Shaw, Recent Developments in the Field of Labour Market Equality: Sex Discrim-
ination Law in the Federal Republic of Germany, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 18 (1991)
(discussing the interpretation of § 611a BGB).
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fications of the two men hired." Since the complainant would
not have been hired in any case, no actual discrimination had
taken place.
The complainant then brought her case to the Federal
Constitutional Court, arguing that the labor court's interpreta-
tion of section 611a was inconsistent with article 3's guaran-
tees. The Federal Constitutional Court agreed with the com-
plainant. The Court's discussion began by reaffirming the fac-
tual equality approach to article 3, paragraph 2. Referring to
its language in the Prohibition on Night Work Decision, the
Court noted that "t]he proposition 'men and women have
equal rights' aims not only to set aside legal norms that advan-
tage or disadvantage based on gender, but to achieve equal
rights between the sexes for the future. It aims towards the
assimilation of social roles and relationships."' 6 The Court
further stated that although the interpretation of section 611a
was primarily a matter for the labor courts, the Constitutional
Court had the responsibility of ensuring that their interpreta-
tion of section 611a took appropriate account of the "influence"
of constitutional rights, and in particular, the "goals of protec-
tion" associated with certain constitutional rights." 'With
respect to regulations which are intended to fulfill constitution-
al 'duties of protection,' the constitutional right is violated
when the interpretation and application [of the regulations]
fundamentally offends the constitutionally-indicated goal of
protection.""
In accordance with this responsibility, the Court reversed
the labor court's decision, holding that its interpretation failed
to adequately fulfill article 3, paragraph 2's "goal of protection"
(Schutzzweck) against sex-based discrimination.79 First, the
labor court had erred by defining discrimination in terms of
the final decision of whether or not to hire. The Court stated
that regardless of whether gender made a difference in the
final decision of whom to hire, a violation of section 611a takes
place if it can be shown considerations of gender affected any
point in the hiring process including, for example, the decision
75. Judgment of Nov. 16, 1993, BVerfG, 89 BVerfGE 276, 280 (F-R.G.).
76. Id. at 285.
77. Id. at 285-86.
78. Id. at 286.
79. Id.
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of whom to interview."0 This interpretation was required in
order to guarantee an effective protection against discrimina-
tion. "If one fails to evaluate the preliminary steps in the hir-
ing process, the employer may render discriminatory actions
inconsequential by subsequently offering appropriate grounds
for his hiring decision. He would thus have the opportunity,
through appropriate arrangements of his hiring procedure, to
reduce the chances of women applicants whom, on the basis of
gender, he judges to be less qualified .... "
Second, the Court determined that the labor court had
erred by implying a violation of section 611a would occur only
if discrimination was the sole cause of the decision not to hire.
Rather, the Court explained, a violation of section 611a takes
place as soon as gender is shown to have been one of the set of
factors which influenced an adverse employment decision.82
Finally, the Court held that the labor court had failed to ade-
quately scrutinize the validity of seemingly appropriate job
criteria which, though not included in the job notice, were
presented by the employer as justifications for its employment
decision. To accept such criteria without a convincing showing
by the employer of why such criteria were initially omitted
would contradict article 3, paragraph 2's goal of protection
against discrimination. Thus, through its interpretation of sec-
tion 611a, the labor court had "fundamentally 'misunderstood
article 3, paragraph 2's goal of protection.""
Beyond its importance for the interpretation of sec-
tion 611a, the Federal Constitutional Court's decision in this
case added a new dimension to the meaning of article 3's guar-
antees. By "implying a "goal of protection" in article 3, para-
graph 2, and applying it to encompass discrimination by pri-
vate employers, the Court recognized paragraph 2's equality
guarantee as one which could not only be asserted against
discriminatory treatment by the state, but also against dis-
criminatory treatment by non-state parties. This interpretation
expanded the scope of the equality guarantee from a protection
against illegitimate state power to a protection against the
illegitimate exercise of social power. Moreover, the Court's
80. Id. at 287.
81. Id. at 287-88.
82. Id. at 288.
83. Id. at 286.
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derivation of a "goal of protection" implied the existence of
affirmative obligations for the state to interpret legal norms in
a way that gives appropriate effect to the goal of factual equal-
ity. While the Prohibition on Night Work Decision had merely
suggested that measures aimed towards achieving factual
equality would be permissible, this decision implied that such
measures would, in fact, be required.
It is important to realize that the Court's interpretation of
article 3, paragraph 2 built upon a distinct strand of German
constitutional rights theory which has emphasized the need to
protect certain constitutional values against infringement not
just by the state, but also by private actors. Although it is
accepted that the primary function of basic rights is to provide
protection against state power, there is also explicit recognition
that certain rights must be protected against the exercise of
private power as well. As stated in one leading constitutional
commentary, "human freedom is threatened not just through
the state, but also through non-state power .... [Insofar as
[there is] not to be merely freedom for the powerful, one re-
quires protection against infringements by society.""
In the Federal Constitutional Court's most recent abortion
decision, for example, proposed legislation which would have
relaxed the prerequisites for legal abortions was found uncon-
stitutional because it failed to adequately protect the unborn
person's right to life against infringement by the pregnant
woman. 5 As stated by the Court, "[tihe Basic Law obliges the
state to protect human life, including that of the unborn ....
Legal protection is also owed to the unborn with regards to its
mother. Such protection is only possible when the legislator in
principle forbids her to interrupt her pregnancy."86 Similarly,
German labor courts have held that the Basic Law's free
speech and freedom of religion guarantees provide protection
from undue infringement of these freedoms within private
84. KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZUGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUrSCHLAND 146 (1993).
85. Judgment of May 28, 1993, BVerfG, 88 BVerfGE 203 (F.R.G.).
86. Id. at 203. For discussions comparing the treatment of abortion in Ameri-
can and German constitutional law, see Donald Kommers, Liberty and Community
in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Comparative Perspective, 1985 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 371; Douglass Morris, Abortion and Liberalism: A Comparison Between the
Abortion Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Constitution-
al Court of West Germany, 11 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159 (1988).
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employment contracts. 7 The Constitutional Court's interpre-
tation of article 3, paragraph 2 as providing protection against
discrimination by private employers thus fits into a previously
recognized approach.88
The Prohibition on Night Work Decision had established
factual equality as a goal encompassed by article 3. The
Court's 1993 decision addressing section 611a BGB confirmed
the factual equality approach to article 3, paragraph 2, and
helped to specify its content in two ways. First, by interpreting
article 3, paragraph 2 as a protection against discrimination in
a private employment relationship, the Court recognized that
the principle of factual equality included protection against
discriminatory treatment by non-state institutions. Second, by
implying from article 3, paragraph 2 a "goal of protection"
against societal discrimination, the Court indicated that the
goal of factual equality would confer upon the state affirmative
duties to act.
C. The 1994 Constitutional Reform
The most recent confirmation of the move to factual equal-
ity has taken place on the level of the constitutional text itself.
In October 1994, article 3, paragraph 2 was amended to in-
clude the following language: "The state supports the actual
achievement of equal rights for women and men and works
towards the elimination of existing disadvantages." 9 The
87. See generally FRANZ GAMIvJLCttEG, DIE GRUNDRECHTE Ii ARBEITSRECHT
(1989).
88. The interpretation of constitutional rights in terms of protection against
social power is analyzed in the German literature under the Drittwirkung and
Schutzpflicht doctrines. The term Drittwirkung refers to the influence of constitu-
tional norms on the judicial interpretation of private law (law regulating the gen-
eral legal relations among private groups and individuals). The term Schutzpflicht
refers to the affirmative duty of all state organs-including the legislature-to
protect certain constitutional values. These doctrines are the subject of growing
attention in the German legal literature. See, e.g., ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE,
STAAT, VERFASSUNG, DEmOKRATIE 159-99 (1992); Bernd JeandIeur, Grundrechte
im Spannungsverhdltnis zwischen subjektiven Freiheitsgarantien und objektiven
Grundsatznormen, 4 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 161 (1995); Hans D. Jarrass, Grundrechte
als Wertentscheidungen bzw. objectivrechtliche Prinzipien in der Rechtsprechung des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 110 ARClHV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 363 (1985). For
an excellent discussion in English of the Drittwirkung doctrine, and a comparative
treatment with the American state action doctrine, see Peter Quint, Free Speech
and Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247 (1989).
89. Gesetz zur Anderung des Grundgesetzes, BGBI. I 3146 (F.R.G.). In addi-
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amendment to paragraph 2 was one of a group of amendments
adopted in connection with the Unification Treaty's call for an
evaluation of possible changes to the Basic Law." Pursuant
thereto, a Joint Constitutional Commission consisting of 32
members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat was established in
November 1991." After nearly two years of debates and hear-
ings, the Commission presented its recommendations to the
Parliament. In late September 1994, the Bundesrat and
Bundestag adopted some of the Commission's proposed amend-
ments by the necessary two-thirds majorities.2 Besides the
adoption of the amendment to article 3, paragraph 2, the con-
stitutional amendments adopted included a prohibition of dis-
crimination on the basis of handicap, the adoption of environ-
mental protection as a state goal, and the strengthening of
constitutional language pertaining to the powers of the Ldnder
and the self-administration rights at.the community level.93
tion, Article 3, paragraph 3 was amended to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of handicap. Id.
90. Article 5 of the Unification Treaty provided: "The governments of both
treaty parties recommend that the legislatures of unified Germany, within two
years, should deal with questions regarding change or supplementation of the
Constitution which have been posed by German unification."
Einigungsvertragsgesetz, supra note 3.
91. In setting up the Joint Constitutional Commission, Parliament rejected
suggestions for the creation of a constitutional council which would comprise mem-
bers of Parliament as well as representatives from business, science, and other
interest groups. Parliament also rejected suggestions for the creation of a constitu-
tional convention whose members would be selected through a popular vote. See
FRAUENRECHTE WM GRUNDGESETZ DES GEEINTEN DEUTSCHLAND 21 (Jutta Limbach
& Marion Eckertz-H6fer eds., 1993) (record of the discussion in the Joint Constitu-
tional Commission). Much criticism has been directed towards the lack of public
participation in the recent constitutional reform as well as the perceived lack of
substantial reform. See Mapiges Interesse an der Debatte tiber die Verfassung,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZErrUNG, Feb. 5, 1994, at 1; Interview mit Burkhard
Hirsch zur Verfassungsenderung, Sfiddeutscher Zeitung, June 9, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, SDZ File; Besser als nichts, aber nicht viel, Siiddeutscher
Zeitung, Sept. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SDZ File ("This result
remains as distant from the mandate of the Unification Treaty as the moon.").
92. The amendment process is governed in Article 79 of the Basic Law. As set
forth in Article 79, an amendment to the Basic Law requires the approval of two-
thirds of the members in the Bundestag and of the Bundesrat. GG art. 79
(F.R.G.). Any amendment which would alter the principles established in Article 1
(declaring the dignity of man to be inviolable) or Article 20 (establishing the Fed-
eral Republic as a democratic and social federal state) is prohibited.
93. See Die beschlossenen Verfassungstnderungen, Siiddeutscher Zeitung, Sept.
24, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SDZ File. See generally Dr. Hans-
Jochen Vogel, Die Reform des Grundgesetzes nach der deutschen Einheit,
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Although the amendment to article 3, paragraph 2 has not
yet received attention by the courts, one of the amendment's
primary effects will be to offer unimpeachable reinforcement
for the Constitutional Court's factual equality approach. The
references to "achievement in fact of equal rights" and the
"elimination of existing disadvantages" within the
amendment's language closely resemble the Federal Constitu-
tional Court's interpretation of paragraph 2 as "a command for
equal rights which encompasses social reality." This resem-
blance was no coincidence. The debates within the Joint Con-
stitutional Commission reveal the deliberate intention on the
part of many to support the Constitutional Court's interpretive
turn against critics. As stated by one representative:
Article 3, paragraph 2, properly understood, already contains
a mandate to the state to guarantee the equal placement of
women [Gleichstellung] in society. This is consistently empha-
sized by the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, [this man-
date] is often disputed by the conservatives."
The amendment's language also supports the Constitutional
Court's decision addressing section 611a, which implied the
need for an activist state to achieve paragraph 2's purposes.
The proclamation that "the state supports the achievement in
fact of equal rights" and "works towards the elimination of
existing disadvantages" emphasizes the pro-active nature of
the state's role.
Perhaps the most revealing insights from the recent con-
stitutional amendment process are gained from looking at
DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATr, May 1, 1994, at 497, 497-506.
94. FRAUENRECHTE IM GRUNDGESETZ DES GEEINTEN DEUTSCHLAND, supra note
91, at 23 (quoting the remarks of Heidrun Aim-Mark (Minister, Niedersachsen)).
Similarly, Susanne Rahardt-Vahldieck of the CDU/CSU remarked that:
It is certainly true that Article 3, paragraph 2 already contains a com-
mand for equal rights. I definitely see it in that way. And the Constitu-
tional Court seems to see it in a similar manner. There also exist many
others, some who see it this way, but also some who do not. And there
continues to be disagreement when it comes to legislative measures.
Therefore I think an explanatory amendment to this [paragraph] is im-
portant for all, particularly for women in this country.
Id. at 33. Christine Hohmann-Dennhardt (Minister, Hessen) explained that: "It has
not been such a long time since the proposition that the state has a duty under
Article 3, paragraph 2 .. .to create the conditions for equality and equal rights
was labeled as obscure .... I am very happy that judicial interpretation has
followed us in this point." Id. at 74.
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what failed to be included in the amendment's language. One
unincorporated item was any explicit guidance regarding the
constitutionality of preferential treatment programs. Represen-
tatives from the Social Democratic Party had favored the adop-
tion of a statement that "compensation measures" aimed at
achieving equality would not violate article 3, paragraph 3's
guarantee of equal treatment.95 Such language, however, was
vigorously opposed by representatives of the conservative
Christian Democratic Union and its coalition partner, the Free
Democratic Party. Because these members comprised the ma-
jority of the Constitutional Commission's members and of the
Parliament, no such provision was added.
Also omitted was any further guidance regarding the pre-
cise content of paragraph 2's equality guarantee. While there
was agreement that gender equality required more than sex-
blind legal norms, members of the Joint Constitutional Com-
mission differed sharply over how much more was required.
One representative opined that paragraph 2's equality guaran-
tee mandated "equality in social participation... and in all
dimensions of social and cultural life."96 Others endorsed
"equality of opportunity" while sharply rejecting any guaran-
tees of "equality of results."97 The amendment's lan-
guage-which refers simply to the "achievement in fact of
equal rights"--makes no commitments with respect to this
issue.
III. CONCLUSION
The 1992 Prohibition on Night Work Decision, the 1993
decision interpreting section 611a BGB, and the recently
adopted constitutional amendment have created a significant
shift in the meaning of article 3's gender guarantees. While
these guarantees had originally represented a commitment to
providing equal treatment, they now represent two distinct
conceptualizations of equality. Paragraph 3 embodies the non-
differentiation principle. Paragraph 2, on the other hand, rep-
95. See id. at 299-300.
96. Id. at 62 (quoting the remarks of Representative Wolfgang Ullman
(Bindnis 90/Die Grdnen)).
97. Id. at 34 (quoting the remarks of Representative Hans-Joachim Otto
(F .P.)).
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resents the goal of factual equality. Factual equality, as op-
posed to nondifferentiation, requires a pro-active role on the
part of the state to eliminate unequal social structures and
institutions."
Much about the factual equality approach still requires
further exposition. Unresolved issues include the enforceability
of the legislative branch's duty to act, the relationship between
factual equality and other constitutional values, particularly in
the context of preferential treatment programs, and most fun-
damentally, the concrete meaning of factual equality. For while
it is accepted that factual equality requires the transformation
of existing social structures, the Constitutional Court has not
elaborated upon whether factual equality should be viewed in
terms of equality of opportunity in an abstract sense, or equali-
ty in the distribution of some defined set of social opportunities
and resources. Resolution of these questions will occupy the
German courts for many years to come.
98. The factual equality approach to Article 3, paragraph 2 offers interesting
contrasts with the route taken in United States equal protection doctrine. First,
whereas departures from the nondifferentiation principle in U.S. equal protection
jurisprudence must be justified as permissible exceptions to the rule, German
jurisprudence has now recognized the centrality of an equality principle other than
nondifferentiation. Second, whereas the United States Supreme Court has generally
required affirmative actions to be remedial, thus requiring a specific showing of
past discrimination, the German factual equality approach is explicitly forward-
looking. See Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 IIARV. L. REV. 1 (1986) (discussing the remedial focus of the
Supreme Court's opinions in, among other cases, Regents of the Univ. of California
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986)). But see Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (plurality opinion) (accepting broadcast diversity
as a sufficient justification for FCC minority preference policies); Id. at 601
(Stevens, J., concurring) ("Today the Court squarely rejects the proposition that a
governmental decision that rests on a racial classification is never permissible ex-
cept as a remedy for a past wrong. I endorse this focus on the future benefit,
rather than the remedial justification, of such decisions."). Metro Broadcasting was
recently overruled by the Supreme Court. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115
S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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